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This issue brings together the essays presented  at a conference  at
The  University  of Chicago  Law  School  in April  of 2006. The  essays
focus  on how  we  should count  future  generations  when  considering
projects that will  have lasting effects. The most important and promi-
nent example  is global  warming. Although global  warming may have
some immediate effects, most of the effects of global warming will be
felt  in  the  future. If we  are  to  spend  money  today  to abate  global
warming, we must understand  how to measure  the benefits to future
generations against the costs incurred by the present. Many other pro-
jects have long term effects as well. For example, a decision on where
to store radioactive wastes may have effects lasting many thousands of
years into the  future, and we  must have  a method  of comparing  the
costs  and benefits  today  with the potential  costs  and benefits  in the
future of any given storage mechanism. The goal of the  essays in this
volume is to shed light on this important question.
Most analysts (and  we believe  all of the essays in the conference)
take the position that future generations should count, and most likely
count  equally  to  those  currently  alive.  The  major  question  comes
down to the choice of a discount  rate, how we compare  cash flows oc-
curring at different time periods. In everyday life, we use present val-
ues and future values to compare costs and benefits that occur in dif-
ferent times. Companies, for example, might make  an investment to-
day in the hope of turning a profit in the future. To determine whether
the investment is worthwhile, they discount the costs and benefits to a
single  time  period.  When  we  consider  public projects  that  can  last
generations, however, the effect  of discounting can seem inappropri-
ate. If far enough in the future, benefits can be reduced merely by the
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mathematics of discounting to near zero. Thus, it is standard in analy-
ses  of the issue to  show that  with a  long enough  time period  and a
high  enough  discount  rate, it  is  not  worth  spending  trivial  amounts
today to save millions or billions of individuals living in the future. The
alternative, a zero discount rate, produces similar absurdities. Suppose
we discover that there is a policy in place that will reduce future out-
put by a small percentage, say  1/100 of a percent, starting  in two hun-
dred years. If the economy grows over that time period, this small per-
centage of the future  economy will be larger than a huge percentage
of today's output. Without  discounting, we would want to incur those
costs today to prevent this future harm.
The discounting  effect  is so powerful  that it can drive the  entire
analysis of the problem. For example, since the time of the conference
but before  the publication  of this  volume, the British Treasury pub-
lished  the Stern  Review  on the Economics  of Climate  Change.'  The
review, done  by a well known public finance  economist, Sir Nicholas
Stern, was startling for its claims about the large potential losses from
global warming and the need for dramatic current actions. It was par-
ticularly  startling because  it used standard  models  and data but pro-
duced  quite  different  conclusions  from  other  studies.  (Most models,
while showing  that climate change  abatement  is worthwhile, produce
relatively  modest results.) The  difference, it turns out, was  driven  by
the discount rate. The Stern Review used a discount rate that was ef-
fectively zero  while  standard models  have  a positive  rate. 2  We  could
alternatively  imagine  the Bush Treasury  issuing  a report, using  stan-
dard models and data, that concluded that global warming abatement
was not desirable with the difference  arising solely because of the as-
sumed discount rate.
Because  of its importance, the issue of how to treat events occur-
ring  long  in  the future  has  long  attracted  significant  attention  from
lawyers,  philosophers,  economists,  and  environmental  activists.  A
number  of Nobel Prize  winning  economists  have weighed  in  on the
issue,  and  several  other  conference  volumes  have  previously  been
published. Notwithstanding  the volume  of prior work, there remains
no  consensus  on the proper  discount  rate. The  essays in this  volume
provide  some  new  arguments  and additional  perspective  on this  de-
1  Her Majesty's Treasury, Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change (2006), online
at  http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uklindependent  reviews/stemrevieweconomics-climate-change/
sternreviewjreport.cfm  (visited Jan 29,2006).
2  See generally William Nordhaus, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
(2006), online at http://nordhaus.econ.yale.edulSternReviewD2.pdf  (visited Jan 29,2006).
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bate. As would  be expected, the essays  come to no single conclusion,
although  most of the  authors  believe  that a  positive  discount rate  is
appropriate. Most of the authors also believe the precise discount rate
depends on a variety of empirical as well as ethical factors, such as the
estimate of the  future productivity  of the economy and  the ability  of
the  current  generation  to  transfer  resources  to  the  future  through
means  other  than  the  particular  project  (that  is, if  we  are  going  to
spend money today to help the future by abating  global warming  but
we might want to see if we can spend the same money today and help
the  future  even  more  by  engaging  in  other projects). Although  this
means that after reading  the essays presented here, we will  not know
that  the right  discount  rate  is  a  particular  number, we  think that  we
now have a clearer understanding of how to arrive at such a number.
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